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Abstract
Using an overlapping generations model, this note shows that an improvement
in the efficiency of human capital production decreases the net income of the young
household while increasing that of the old. Without compensating redistribution, it
deteriorates lifetime utilities of all generations except for the initial old households.
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1 Introduction
The importance of the education environment has a prominent place in the literature of
endogenous growth, where the education environment determines the efficiency of human
capital production and thereby critically affects the long-term path of aggregate output.1
This note demonstrates that the education environment also has a nontrivial effect on the
intergenerational distribution of income and that a better education environment does not
necessarily improve the welfare of households in the long run. We present an overlapping
generations model in which young households invest in the process of human capital pro-
duction (i.e., education). A better education environment increases the supply of human
capital. The increased supply of human capital, on one hand, raises the productivity of
physical capital and the interest rate, thereby raising the income of old households. On the
other hand, the net income of young households is reduced because the increased supply
lowers the price of their labor endowments (i.e., wages) while the increased revenue from
selling human capital is offset by education expenses.2 Although the initial old house-
holds unilaterally benefit from increased income, the overall welfare effect on subsequent
generations is shown to be negative under plausible parameter values.
2 Model
Production Technology. A version of Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generations model
is considered, in which time is divided into periods t = 1, 2, · · · ,∞. In each period, a single
final good, denoted by Yt, is competitively produced from physical capital Kt and human
capital Ht by a Cobb-Douglas technology. The production function is Yt = AK
α
t H
1−α
t ,
1In a model with a representative agent, Lucas (1988) and many others have shown that a better
education environment accelerates economic growth. In our separate paper (Kitagawa, Horii and Futagami,
2003), we showed in an overlapping generations model that an expansion in the availability of education
(i.e., the maximum amount of human capital that can be accumulated through education) has non-
monotonic effects on the long-term rate of growth.
2In a static model of child labor, Basu and Van (1998) also showed that an exogenous expansion of
labor-supply capacity does not necessarily benefit its suppliers.
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where A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), respectively, represent total factor productivity and the share
of physical capital. Factor markets are perfectly competitive, so that the market price of
physical capital rt and that of human capital wt, in terms of the final good, are determined
by their marginal productivities:
rt = Aα(Kt/Ht)α−1, wt = A(1− α)(Kt/Ht)α. (1)
The final goods produced in a certain period can either be consumed in that period or be
saved for production in the next period. Once saved, the good can either be used as an
input to human capital production or be used directly as physical capital, which implies
that the price of the saved good (i.e. the interest rate) is rt. Human and physical capital
depreciates within one period and therefore cannot be carried over to subsequent periods.
Households. At each period, there are two generations of households, which we call
the young and the old. Each generation contains a unit mass of households and lives for
two periods. The objective of the generation t households (those born at period t) is to
maximize their lifetime utility
ut = (1− β) ln c1t + β ln c2 t+1, (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter specifying the patience of agents and c1t and c2 t+1 represent
their consumption in youth and old age. The young households are endowed with one unit
of human capital. In addition, they can augment their human capital through education,
which must be financed by borrowing from the old. Let et ≥ 0 be the amount of saved
goods borrowed from the old generation to invest in this process. Then the amount of
their human capital is
Ht = 1 + γet, (3)
where parameter γ ≥ 0 represents the quality of the education environment, which de-
termines the efficiency of human capital production. They sell off their human capital at
market price wt and in return receive wt(1+γet) units of the final good. After repaying rtet
units of the final good, they consume part of their net income at the end of that period and
save the remainder for consumption in their old age. The intertemporal budget constraint
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is
c1t + c2 t+1/rt+1 = wt(1 + γet)− rtet. (4)
For every t ≥ 0, the generation t households choose et, c1t and c2 t+1 so as to maximize
(2) under constraint (4). Net income in the right hand side of (4) is maximized by choosing
et



= 0 if wt − γrt < 0;
∈ [0,+∞) if wt − γrt = 0;
= +∞ if wt − γrt > 0.
(5)
Since human capital investment must be finite in equilibrium, condition (5) implies that
wt − rt ≤ 0 with equality whenever et > 0. (6)
From (2), (4) and (6), the consumption and savings of generation t ≥ 0 households in
equilibrium are written in terms of factor prices:
c1t = (1− β)wt, c2 t+1 = βrt+1wt, St = βwt. (7)
At period 0, the initial old (generation −1) households are endowed with S0 > 0 units of
saved goods and consume r0S0 units of final goods in exchange for their endowment.
Equilibrium. Substituting (1) and (3) into condition (6) gives a relation between two
kinds of capital,
Ht = max
½
γ 1− αα Kt, 1
¾
. (8)
Aggregate demand for the saved good consists of demand for physical capital Kt and
demand for input to human capital investment. From (3), the latter is γ−1(Ht− 1). Thus,
the market-clearing condition for saved goods is
Kt + γ−1(Ht − 1) = St−1, (9)
where St−1 is the savings of generation t−1 households. Given St−1, (8) and (9) determine
the equilibrium (Kt, Ht) pair,
¡
Kt, Ht
¢
=



¡
St−1, 1
¢
if St−1 ≤ α/(γ(1− α));¡
α(St−1 + 1/γ), (1− α)(γSt−1 + 1)
¢
if St−1 > α/(γ(1− α)),
(10)
3
Panel 1: γ ≤ bγ Panel 2: γ > bγ
Figure 1: Saving Dynamics
which shows that young households invest in human capital if and only if St−1 > α/(γ(1−
α)). Substituting (1) and (10) into (7) yields the saving dynamics:
St =



βA(1− α)Sαt−1 if St−1 < α/(γ(1− α));
βAαα(1− α)1−αγ−α ≡ eS(γ) if St−1 ≥ α/(γ(1− α)). (11)
Given initial S0 > 0, equation (11) generates the equilibrium sequence of aggregate
saving. As shown by Figure 1, the sequence monotonically converges to
S∗(γ) =



(βA(1− α))1/(1−α) ≡ S if γ ≤ bγ;
eS(γ) if γ > bγ, (12)
where bγ ≡ α (βA(1− α)2−α)−1/(1−α). Observe from Panel 2 of Figure 1 that the economy
settles to the steady state in one period whenever γ > bγ and et > 0. The pair of factor
prices in the steady state is obtained by substituting (12) for (1):
¡
w∗(γ), r∗(γ)
¢
=



¡
S/β,α/((1− α)β)
¢
if γ ≤ bγ;¡eS(γ)/β, γ eS(γ)/β¢ if γ > bγ. (13)
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3 Implications of a Better Education Environment
Welfare effects. Equation (13) implies that in the long run households receive education
only if γ > bγ. When γ is in this range, a better education environment (i.e., higher
efficiency of human capital production) increases the interest rate but reduces the wage
rate in the steady state. Then, from (7), consumption of young households decreases,
whereas that of old households tends to increase.3 Substituting (7) and (13) into the
utility function (2) gives the lifetime utility of consumers in the steady state:
u∗(γ) = constant + lnw∗(γ) + β ln r∗(γ)
= constant + (β(1− α)− α) ln γ.
(14)
Lifetime utility is decreasing in γ if (and only if)
β < α/(1− α). (15)
Recall that α is the share of physical capital while β is the young agents’ propensity to
save. Using a conventional value of 0.3 for α, condition (15) becomes β < 0.428, which
is met under plausible values for β. In addition, (15) coincides with the condition for the
economy to be dynamically efficient for all γ in the steady state because applying (15) for
(13) gives r∗(γ) ≥ α/((1− α)β) > 1.4 Therefore, a better education environment reduces
the lifetime utility of agents in the long run given that parameters are within an empirically
plausible range or in a range that guarantees the economy’s dynamic efficiency.
Who benefits? One may wonder why relaxing one of the resource constraints in the
economy results in an adverse consequence. To be precise, the economy with a high γ
is not Pareto inferior to the economy with a low γ, because consumption of the initial
old households is higher in the economy with a high γ.5 This implies that existing old
3When γ > bγ, consumption of old households is (βAαα(1 − α)1−α)2γ1−2α, which is increasing in γ
given that α < 1/2. We assume, reasonably, that α < 1/2 because α is the share of physical (non human)
capital.
4Since population is constant over time, dynamic efficiency requires the gross interest rate to be higher
than 1.
5Recall that initial old households consume r0S0 units of goods, where r0 is (weakly) increasing in γ
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households in each period have an incentive to implement various policies that aim to
improve the educational environment for young households whenever possible. Contrary to
the usual perception, these seemingly altruistic policies actually benefit the old generation
themselves while future generations are thrust into an ‘educational rat race’.
Combination of policies. When combined with appropriate redistributional poli-
cies, however, a better education environment can improve the welfare of all generations.
Substituting (10) into the production function and then differentiating it with respect to
γ yields
∂Yt
∂γ =



0 if St−1 ≤ αγ(1−α) .
A
³
α
γ(1−α)
´α ³
St−1 − αγ(1−α)
´
> 0 if St−1 >
α
γ(1−α) .
(16)
Given St−1, (16) shows that aggregate output is increasing in γ whenever young households
invest in human capital. Thus, old households benefit from a larger γ even when the
authority implements a lump-sum redistribution policy that transfers income from the old
to the young so that the income of young households (and therefore their savings) are
unaffected by the increase in γ. When continued forever, this combination of a larger
γ and the intergenerational transfer benefits all generations because they can enjoy more
consumption when old while consumption in their youth is unchanged. In an economy with
a highly developed education system, this argument legitimizes income transfers from old
to young in the forms of grants and scholarships funded by taxes on the elder generation.6
and S0 is historically given.
6In the U.S., the percentage of students receiving grants and the average amounts received by students
with grant aid have increased between 1990 and 2000, which seems to be mitigating the problem. (Choy,
2004). By contrast, the Japanese government has recently abolished a scholarship loan forgiveness program
so that all scholarships received by Japanese residents must be repaid after graduation. Although the
supply of scholarship loans has been increased in compensation, our model predicts that this change will
aggravate intergenerational income inequality in the long run.
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